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T··-~·-7 /' HE· BIGGEST AND MOST INTENSE BATTLE IN ··: \the U.S. health care system during the past / three decades has been over two interrelated 
/ questions: first; who will control the manner in which 
j,- medical car~ is P,aid for, and, second, how much will it cost? 
. " Many health care experts believe that Medicare's efforts at 
cost control, primarily in the form of the program's seminal 
transition to and continual modification of prospective pay-
ment of health care providers, has both triggered and 
repeatedly intensified the economic restructuring of the U.S. 
health care system. Medicare is an almost $600 billion pub-
lic health insurance program for individuals sixty-five years 
of age and older; individuals under sixty-five with certain 
disabilities (with eligibility depenqent on the severity of the 
disability and the resultant consequences for a person's abil-
ity to work), and those with end-stage renal disease). With 
regard to how the program reimburses for care, "Medicare 
sets prospectively the payment amount (rates) providers will 
receive for most covered products and services, and provid-
ers agree to accept them as payment in fun:· according to the 
Medicare Payment Advisory Commission. "Thus, in most 
instances, providers' payments are based on predetermined 
rates and are unaffected by their costs or posted charges:'1 
MEDICARE'S VAST INFLUENCE 
Medicare payment reforms have empowered the federal gov-
ernment's effort at cost control in ways that are similar to 
health care systems in other industrialized countries.2 They 
have (1) given the U.S. government de facto control over the 
price of most medical care and (2) ended the era, dating back 
to the 1920s, in which doctors' and hospitals' authority over 
medical prices and decision making went virtually unques-
tioned. 3 The key to Medicare's role as the leading catalyst for 
change in the U.S. health care system is the program's 
immense size and influence.4 As the single largest individual 
buyer of health care and the "first mover" in the annual pay-
ment game between those who provide medical care and 
those who pay for it, Medicare invariably drives the behavior 
of both medical providers and private payers. 
Medicare's revolutionary transition from traditional 
cost reimbursement (generally paying hospitals and physi-
cians what they submitted in the way of costs) to a prospec-
tive payment model began in 1983. In that year, Congress 
changed the program's method of paying hospitals to a sys-
tem of predetermined payment amounts for individual 
diagnosis-related groups (DRGs). In 1989, following the 
success of DRGs in restraining the rate of growth in 
Medicare's hospital expenditures, Congress enacted a simi-
lar program-a resource-based relative-value scale with a 
standardized fee schedule-for Medicare's reimbursement 
of physicians. The program went into effect in 1992. With 
the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Congress reformed the 
reimbursement processes of the remaining cost-based com-
ponents of Medicare, including outpatient ambulatory ser-
vices and post-acute care (such as skilled nursing facilities 
and home health agencies). By 2003, twenty years after 
Medicare started the payment revolution in America's 
health care system, the program had become fully "prospec-
tivized" in its reimbursement of all medical providers. 
Medicare also plays a significant role in supporting the 
education of health professionals, particularly medical 
school graduates training as residents in the nation's more 
than one thousand teaching hospitals. The program's direct 
and indirect financial support of medical training (direct in 
the form of paying the salaries of the residents and the 
supervising physicians' time, around $3 billion, and indirect 
in the form of subsidizing other hospital expenses associ-
ated with running training programs, around $6-$7 billion) 
amounted to upwards of$10 billion in 2012. 
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Each time Congress changed one part of Medicare 
from cost reimbursement to prospective rate-setting, the 
overall growth of the program's expenditures slowed. A sig-
nificant, albeit temporary, measure of cost control was 
achieved. Yet these spending reductions have often come at 
the expense of health care providers compensating by 
increasing their revenues from private payers. "When 
Medicare slows its rate of expenditure growth;' explains 
David Abernethy, former senior Medicare specialist and Staff 
Director of the House Ways and Means Health Subcommittee, 
"hospitals' overall rate of revenue growth slows and that, in 
the end, puts the final pressure on private payers:·s This 
increased use of cost shifting (or cross-subsidization or dif-
ferential pricing) by medical providers, in which changes in 
administered prices of one payer lead to compensating 
changes in prices charged to other payers for care, propelled 
the growth of private sector efforts (namely, managed care in 
the 1990s) to achieve similar cost control. 
Ultimately, the change in Medicare's reimbursement 
policy altered the balance of power between the federal gov-
ernment and medical providers. By increasing the scope and 
extent of Medicare's regulation through prospective pay-
ment, Congress for the first time gained the upper hand in 
its financial relationship with hospitals and then with physi-
cians in terms of setting medical prices. Yet the federal 
government has done little to extend Medicare's success in 
controlling prices to controlling the volume of services pro-
vided.6 Therefore, although Medicare's Prospective Payment 
System (PPS) has been more influential than anything else 
in rationalizing health care prices in the United States, the 
program has never gained major and lasting control over 
utilization or total costs. Thus, Medicare's rate of expendi-
ture growth and relatively meager results at cost contain-
ment in recent years remain issues of enormous political 
concern? 
Moreover, Medicare does not cover all health care 
costs for its beneficiaries. The program's Part A benefits 
cover inpatient hospital stays, skilled nursing facility stays, 
home health visits, and hospice care, but there is a deduct-
ible ($1,156 in 2012) and coinsurance requirements. The 
program's Part B benefits cover physician visits, outpatient 
services, preventive services, and home health visits, but 
there is also a monthly premium that beneficiaries must pay 
($140 in 2012). Also, Part D, the voluntary, subsidized out-
patient prescription drug benefit that George W Bush 
(2001-2009) signed into law in 2003 and that went into 
effect in 2006, also includes deductibles and monthly premi-
ums that vary by drug plan and beneficiary income. 
Passage of Medicare's Prospective Payment 
System Driven by the Need for Cost Containment 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, rampant medical inflation 
forced policymakers to search for ways to control Medicare's 
rapidly escalating costs. With doctors and hospital execu-
tives in control of the U.S. health care system for decades, 
virtually unrestricted cost reimbursement had become the 
dominant model for financing public and private medical 
care. Independent not-for-profit hospitals and physicians 
practicing alone or in small groups dominated the medical 
landscape. Notes Bradford Gray, 
Third-party payers (both private and public) played their 
financing role passively, reluctant to interfere with medi-
cal decision-making and the doctor-patient relationship. 
They paid for medical care by reimbursing for costs 
incurred or charges billed by health care providers and 
did little to control which services were provided or how 
much they cost.8 
The medical inflation that grew directly out of these 
delivery structures and payment systems became unsustain-
able. In 1980, hospital spending grew 16.4 percent, as the 
nation's total health care expenditures reached $230 billion, 
a threefold increase from $69 billion in 1970.9 In Ronald 
Reagan's (1981-1989) first full year in office, hospital spend-
ing increased 17.5 percent.10 The following year the country 
slipped into the worst recession in half a century, with the 
unemployment rate reaching almost 11 percent. 
Out of financial necessity, therefore, Congress and a 
handful of state governments commissioned experiments in 
alternative reimbursement systems. The most promising 
conceptual innovation, prospective payment with predeter-
mined reimbursement rates, was the product of pioneering 
research at the University of Michigan and Yale University. 
Using data from Connecticut's hospitals, Yale professors 
John Thompson and Robert Fetter demonstrated that medi-
cal care could be standardized and measured. As a result, 
policymakers and administrators were able, for the. first 
time, to compare prices across different hospitals for the 
same services. They found an enormous amount of unjusti-
fiable variation, which called into question medical provid-
ers' authority to regulate their own affairs. 
Rising Medical Costs 
The deadly combination of inexorably rising medical infla-
tion and deep economic deterioration forced elected leaders 
to pursue the radical reform of Medicare to keep the pro-
gram from insolvency. Federal policymakers-led primarily 
by President Reagan's health and human services secretary, 
Richard Schweiker (in office 1981-1983)-eventually 
turned to the one alternative reimbursement system that 
analysts and academics had studied more than any other 
and even tested with apparent success in New Jersey: pro-
spective payment with DRGs. Rather than simply reimburs-
ing hospitals whatever costs they incurred in treating 
Medicare patients, the new model would pay hospitals a 
predetermined, set rate based on a patient's diagnosis. The 
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payment would be unrelated to any specific hospital's costs. 
Instead, it would be a national payment based on the costs 
of a general hospital. Thus, if a hospital could treat a patient 
for less than the standard DRG payment, it could keep the 
savings as a profit. If it cost the hospital more, it had to 
absorb the difference as a financial loss. Once Republican 
leaders became convinced that PPS could be used to reduce 
federal budget deficits, as well as create new profit and effi-
ciency incentives for hospitals based on an increase in vol-
ume, the political obstacles to radically transforming 
Medicare finally dissolved. 
Realigning Financial Incentives 
Ironically, the most significant change in health policy since 
the passage of Medicare and Medicaid (the publicly financed, 
federal-state health insurance program for low-income 
Americans) in 1965 went virtually unnoticed by the general 
public. Nevertheless, the change was significant. For the first 
time in U.S. history, the federal government acquired a size-
able measure of power in its financial relationship with the 
hospital industry. Together with Congress's development 
and use of the budget reconciliation process, Medicare's new 
prospective payment system with DRGs infringed on the 
hospital industry's sovereignty and autonomy. Also, the new 
and vastly increased amount of government regulation that 
Medicare's PPS represented was paradoxical in that it pur-
ported to mimic the dynamic forces of the free market. By 
realigning financial incentives, policymakers designed the 
new system to bring Medicare's rate of cost growth under 
control. 
Developing a new hospital reimbursement model was 
one thing; enacting it was another. A financial crisis affect-
ing Social Security between 1982 and 1983 provided the 
Reagan administration and leading members of Congress 
with the necessary legislative opportunity to pass Medicare's 
prospective payment system as part of a larger and even 
more urgent package of welfare state reforms. Mushrooming 
budget deficits (stemming from President Reagan's major 
tax cuts passed in 1981), together with the highest unem-
ployment rate and the worst recession in decades, created a 
sense of fiscal and economic crisis. When the Social Security 
boards of trustees released their annual reports on April 1, 
1982, they noted that the Social Security system would be 
unable to pay cash benefits beginning in July 1983. Medicare's 
trust funds were in somewhat better shape, they reported, 
but the program still faced serious financial problems, 
including bankruptcy, by the late 1980s or early 1990s, 
unless changes were made.U 
Following a decade of development, experimentation, 
and analysis, the passage of Medicare's new prospective pay-
ment system with DRGs represented something of an 
administrative revolution. Key to policymakers' success was 
the strange political attraction of prospective payment. 
Hospital industry representatives were already desperate for 
any alternative to the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility 
Act (TEFRA), budget legislation that was primarily aimed at 
quickly increasing tax revenue to reduce deficits. However, 
congressional leaders of both parties and Reagan adminis-
tration officials wanted increased control of Medicare to 
restrain the program's rate of growth, despite the fact that 
prospective payment required significantly increased gov-
ernment regulation and control of health care. Also, with 
Social Security literally on the verge of bankruptcy in 1983, 
policymakers finally had a legislative vehicle for compre-
hensive Medicare reform that was unstoppable. 
CHALLENGES POSED BY 
CHANGES IN MEDICARE 
Following the rapid passage of Medicare's reimbursement 
system, a new set of concerns arose: Would the system actu-
ally work? Would Medicare's rate of expenditure growth 
subside? How would hospitals respond to the new incen-
tives? Would any particular set of hospitals be wiped out 
financially by the new system? How would patients be 
affected, if at all? The only thing policymakers did know for 
sure was that, with a program as imrpense as Medicare, it 
was impossible to change just one thing. 12 The ripple effects 
of moving to a prospective payment system were bound to 
be extensive. 
Phase-In Years of Medicare's New 
Hospital Cost Containment System 
As it turned out, Medicare's new payment model had a major 
impact on hospital administration during its four-year 
phase-in period. During this time, the hospital industry's 
financial view of Medicare patients changed significantly. 
Instead of providing as much care as could be medically justi-
fled, hospitals shifted their focus to increasing efficiency and 
shortening Medicare patients' length of stay. In so doing, the 
PPS operated as a huge shock to the natioris hospital indus-
try, because it completely reengineered the billing structure 
accounting for approximately 40 percent of every hospital's 
total revenue. The rate of growth in Medicare's hospital 
expenditures slowed considerably. Substantial cost control 
was accomplished with regard to Medicare hospital payment. 
No change in the private sector could ever have effected so 
much change in the U.S. health care system in so short a 
period of time. The Medicare payment reforms "were the 
most drastic and far-reaching changes in federal health pol-
icy since the passage of Medicare itself,' notes David Smith. 
They were "remarkable for the comprehensiveness and 
sophistication of their design-indeed, the sheer technical 
achievement was astonishing:•u 
Medicare's transition to its new prospective payment 
system changed the focus of care. In fact, never had so much 
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change in hospital management transpired in so short a 
period of time. Previously, because Medicare paid hospitals 
whatever costs they incurred, hospitals had no incentive to 
control their operating expenses. Higher costs translated 
into increased payments from Medicare, which administra-
tors could, and often did, use to expand their hospitals' pro-
grams and services. 14 The PPS completely upended this 
status quo. By categorizing all hospital services and proce-
dures, the new system allowed policymakers to know what 
medical care would cost before Medicare beneficiaries 
received it; the PPS established predetermined payment 
amounts for 467 different diagnosis-related groups. (In fact, 
the number ofDRGs has increased over the years to approx-
imately 536 to account for new procedures and services.) If 
the hospital managed to treat a Medicare patient for less than 
the DRG allotted, it kept the "savings" as profit. Conversely, 
if the hospital incurred more costs than the DRG allotted, it 
had to absorb the difference as a loss. 15 As a result, the struc-
ture of Medicare's financial incentives flipped. By separating 
an individual hospital's level of reimbursement from its pro-
duction costs, the PPS triggered a radical change in hospital 
administration. The focus shifted from providing as much 
care as possible to maximizing the overall profit from each 
Medicare patient.16 
The initial success of Medicare's new reimbursement 
model encouraged a number of key congressional leaders 
and the staff of the Health Care Finance Administration 
(HCFA; the predecessor to the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services) to make a series of changes that, ironi-
cally, resulted in the PPS becoming more complex and 
political rather than less (as originally intended). The pro-
cess began in the mid-1980s when senior congressional 
leaders turned to the PPS as a new and hugely effective 
deficit reduction device. By simply restraining the annual 
increases in Medicare's hospital payment rates, Congress 
was able to divert tremendous amounts of government rev-
enue for reducing annual deficits and increasing spending in 
other areas of the federal budget. Congress repeatedly 
adjusted Medicare's payment rates at levels below annual 
increases in medical inflation, which would not have been 
enormously consequential had the hospital industry as a 
whole restrained its cost growth. However, it did not. In the 
late 1980s and early 1990s, hospitals' costs continued to 
increase at their pre-PPS levels. 
Yet "squeezing" Medicare payments to all hospitals 
for larger fiscal objectives struck many policymakers as 
unfair, because some hospitals were in a much better posi-
tion than others to absorb a decline in Medicare reim-
bursement. Therefore, Congress began selectively 
targeting increased payment rates to specific hospital 
groups (teaching, rural, inner-city). Along the way, the 
original goal of the PPS-to establish one set of national, 
wage-adjusted payment rates-became eclipsed by the 
new goal of using the PPS to address major federal budget 
imbalances. In essence, as Medicare payment policy 
became increasingly subordinated to fiscal policy, 
Congress sought ways to try to ensure that the inevitable 
"rough justice" of moving to a national, standardized pay-
ment system would remain as financially fair as possible 
to the nation's hospital industry. 
Medicare's PPS Triggers Private Sector 
Cost Containment with Managed Care 
As Congress tightened Medicare's reimbursement policies, 
hospitals responded by increasing their charges to private 
payers. "Why it took private payers until the early 1990s 
before they began to marshal even a modicum of counter-
vailing market power" is perplexing, notes Uwe Reinhardt.17 
However, employers eventually found their paradigmatic 
response: managed care. Prepaid group practice, a form of 
managed care, did precede Medicare's PPS, but organized 
medicine's traditional opposition to any form of reimburse-
ment other than the fee-for-service model associated with 
indemnity insurance kept managed care marginalized for 
decades. What ultimately made market incentives suffi-
cient to induce a paradigm shift in the private sector away 
from indemnity insurance and toward managed care was 
the success of Medicare's PPS in controlling health care 
costs in the public sector. What is ironic about the rapid 
shift in the U.S. health care system from a predominantly 
not-for-profit ethos to a more corporate orientation is that 
it was largely the incidental byproduct of federal policy 
initiatives designed to control Medicare's costs. 18 In other 
words, before business behavior triggered the managed 
care revolution, and the increased commercialization of 
health care that followed in its wake, it was largely a 
response to and an unintended consequence of government 
policymaking-in this instance, Medicare payment 
reforms. 
By examining the connections between Medicare's 
subordination to budget policy and the rise of managed care, 
one finds that government policymakers in the late 1980s 
increasingly used the PPS as a powerful tool to address fed-
eral budget imbalances and increase spending on other 
government programs at the expense of health care provid-
ers (particularly hospitals but also physicians). Instead of 
increasing the payroll tax for Medicare (1.45 percent paid by 
workers and 1.45 percent by employers and deposited into 
Medicare's Part A Hospital Insurance Trust Fund) or making 
the program's beneficiaries pay more for their medical care, 
government leaders unintentionally increased less visible tax 
expenditures-tax revenue forgone-by precipitating a sig-
nificant increase in health insurance costs for businesses.19 
In short, Congress and the George H.W. Bush administra-
tion (1989-1993) made it clear that the government was 
only going to control Medicare's hospital costs; employers 
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were on their own.20 The hospital industry responded to 
Congress's systematic reduction in Medicare's generosity by 
increasing the charges billed to their privately insured 
patients.l' By its very definition, this billing behavior (most 
commonly referred to as "cost shifting") was simply passed 
along the payment chain and contributed significantly to 
large annual increases in private health insurance premiums. 
Ironically, federal tax revenue was forgone in this bud-
getary process, because private businesses simply absorbed 
the increased costs charged by hospitals. Over time, there-
fore, an increasing number of employers responded to the 
growing imperative for cost control by ditching more expen-
sive indemnity insurance for their workers in favor of 
cheaper managed care alternatives. This linkage illustrates 
that nothing can transform an industry more quickly and 
profoundly than when the government -if it is an industry's 
single largest customer-dramatically alters how it pays for 
goods and services. 
Managed Care 
Managed care as a term hardly existed until the early 
1990s. Yet employers' shifting of their workers away from 
fee-for-service health insurance was facilitated by the man-
aged care industry's ability to quickly construct networks 
of participating providersY Between 1988 and 1993, man-
aged care organizations responded to employers' demands 
for more cost control by consolidating and applying exten-
sive utilization review and guideline development to their 
more traditional fee-for-service insurance offerings.B The 
traditional managed care organizations, such as staff- or 
group-model health maintenance organizations (HMOs)-
for example, Kaiser Permanente-required significant 
expenditures in "bricks and mortar" when entering new 
markets. This served as a major barrier to entry because 
they were vertically integrated organizations that operated 
their own physical facilities in different geographic loca-
tions and whose physicians worked solely for the managed 
care organization.24 
Beginning in the late 1980s and early 1990s, however, 
many new for-profit HMOs experienced rapid growth 
because they were "virtual organizations" or "organizations 
without walls;· built largely on contractual (paper) relation-
ships with community providers.25 These new HMOs 
began competing with the traditional prepaid group prac-
tices by contracting with networks of private physicians 
called independent practice associations (IPAs). In this 
newer type of HMO, physicians would provide care for 
HMO patients in their own offices, but not at a shared 
clinic. This model kept health plans from having to invest 
in "bricks and mortar" or hire their own personnel. The 
IPA approach also enabled HMOs to enter new markets 
more quickly and with much lower capital expenses than 
the traditional prepaid group practices. 
The initial shift to managed care had a self-reinforcing 
quality to it that fed back into the momentum away from 
fee-for-service insurance. Managed care organizations ini-
tially attracted and enrolled low-risk individuals who were 
least likely to object to restrictions on utilization of services 
and physician choice.26 Because these low-risk individuals 
also tended to be healthier than the general population, they 
did not increase operating costs; on the contrary, they 
increased the profitability of managed care organizations. 27 
Meanwhile, by expanding their provider base and involving 
in their systems more physicians whose predominant prac-
tice was fee-for-service, managed care organizations devel-
oped to the point that employers took them more seriously 
and found them significa?tly more attractive.28 Why? 
Because by increasing their number of affiliated medical 
providers, managed care organizations essentially became 
more effective "managed cost" plans, which could negotiate 
lower prices on behalf of larger numbers of patients and 
then pass the savings on to employers.29 Before this balance 
of power shifted to payers in the early 1990s, providers had 
set prices and determined fees in most markets.30 The 
advent of Medicare's PPS provided private payers with a 
critical benchmark for categorizing and comparing medical 
providers' prices.31 
Cost Control or a Temporary Success? 
During the mid-1990s, employers experienced minimal to 
no growth in their health insurance costs, largely because 
managed care clamped down on medical spending and 
decreased hospitals' ability to charge privately insured 
patients more. The United States spent almost .$120 billion 
less on health care in 1996 than the Congressional Budget 
Office had predicted in its 1993 forecastY With declining 
private payments from managed care, the hospital industry 
finally achieved significant cost control. 
Ultimately, therefore, much of the (temporary) success 
in containing Medicare's cost growth came at the expense of 
hospitals increasing their revenue from privately insured 
patients. Exactly how much hospital cost shifting was spe-
cifically caused by Medicare's PPS is difficult, if not impos-
sible, to determine. Nevertheless, employers simply bought 
into the cost shifting argument made by ProPAC, health 
policy journalists, and others, regardless of how much 
empirical support there was for it. This confounds the cau-
sation question, because if employers believed that cost shift-
ing was driving the inflation in their health care costs (and 
then acted on this belief), then that belief was a powerful 
influence in its own right. 
Moreover, causality comes in different forms.33 With 
respect to prospective payment, explains David Smith, the 
image of a river and flooding rains is helpful. The rain 
comes down (cost drivers are continually raising the cost of 
nedicine), and there are many tributaries-new medical 
232 PART Ill ~ CONTEMPORARY HEALTH POLICY ISSUES: GOALS AND INITIATIVES (1920s-TODAY) 
technology, rising prices, more elderly patients-filling the 
river. The PPS functioned, in part, as a diverting dam that 
helped to keep the flood away from Medicare. Yet the water 
was simply diverted back into the river. In other words, only 
Medicare was (temporarily) sheltered from ever-increasing 
medical inflation, and, after the PPS went into effect, the 
flooding problem became even worse because more water 
(cost drivers) was now moving down a smaller channel. In 
short, a huge part of the medical economy, Medicare, was no 
longer doing its part to absorb a significant portion of ever-
increasing medical inflation because it was containing 
health care cost growth. This left employers in the private 
sector to make up the difference. 34 
This cost-shifting phenomenon became a major moti-
vation for businesses to begin moving their workers into 
various forms of cheaper managed care. The responsibility 
for either paying more for medical care or accepting 
increased rationing-which the government chose not to 
do-now fell squarely on employers and other purchasers in 
charge of health care spending.35 They quickly moved many 
of their employees out of traditional indemnity insurance 
and into various forms of managed care. 
HMOs, however, sowed the seeds for future trouble by 
not fundamentally altering or improving the delivery of 
health care (as staff- and group-model HMOs such as 
Harvard Community Health, Kaiser Permanente, and 
Group Health had done for years in specific areas of the 
country, such as Boston, California, and Seattle, respec-
tively). Instead, insurers simply employed the term HMO 
and focused on using contracting leverage to both negotiate 
discounts from medical providers and impose distant con-
trols on them. The health care that resulted from these new 
arrangements was hardly more "managed" than it had been 
under traditional indemnity insurance. For these reasons, 
and others, managed care's cost containment efforts in the 
private sector eventually proved enormously unpopular and 
acrimonious in the latter half of the 1990s. 
Medicare's Subsequent Cost Containment 
Success with Physician Expenditures 
The cost-control success associated with Medicare's DRGs 
for hospitals led policymakers to rationalize the program's 
reimbursement of physicians. They adopted a resource-
based relative-value scale (RBRVS) with a standardized fee 
schedule. One goal was to reduce payments to surgeons and 
specialists and increase them to internists and general prac-
titioners. The main goal of the RBRVS and fee schedule, 
however, was to slow the rate of cost growth of Medicare 
Part B (which covers physician visits, outpatient services, 
preventive services, and home health visits and accounted 
for 20 percent of benefit spending in 2012}; Part B benefits 
are subject to a deductible ($140 in 2012), and cost-sharing 
generally applies for most Part B benefits. When the new 
payment system went into effect in 1992, the growth in vol-
ume and intensity of Medicare's spending on physician ser-
vices slowed dramatically. Thus, the federal government 
succeeded in shifting another balance-of-power arrange-
ment, in this instance, from physicians to Medicare. 
Through most of the 1990s, Medicare's RBRVS-based 
fee schedule was viewed as a significant success by most 
observers. A sign of its acceptance is the fact that, much 
more than is the case with DRGs, the RBRVS system that 
was adopted and maintained by Medicare became adopted 
by most private payers.36 Before the RBRVS system, the pri-
vate insurers that abandoned the inflationary "usual, cus-
tomary, and reasonable" payment approach often used 
relative value scales that had been based on historic charges, 
thereby perpetuating the alleged distortions among the 
various categories of services.37 Private payers now typically 
rely on the RBRVS relativities, even if they often use differ-
ent conversion factors to reflect local market factors that 
dictate their ability to negotiate fees with physicians.38 
Perhaps because organized medicine was given a major role 
in maintaining and updating the RBRVS system through the 
Relative-Value Scale Update Committee, physicians gener-
ally accepted the resultant shift in relativities of different 
services, even if they continued to strenuously object to 
expenditure limits (cost containment). 
An added benefit of the expenditure limitation mecha-
nism was that it was formula-driven. Congress merely 
needed to tinker with some parts of the formula, based on 
recommendations from the Physician Payment Review 
Commission (PPRC) and HCFA could meet its obligations 
to make the necessary changes in the payment systems that 
the contractors administered without any disruption in the 
flow of dollars to physicians for services rend!!red.39 With 
control over budgetary expenditures for Part B (physician 
services}, Congress did not concern itself much with "win-
ners and losers" among the medical profession. Congress 
and the HCFA were more than happy to let the American 
Medical Association preside over inevitable "food fights" 
within the profession when cutting the pie of physician 
expenditures. Already having control over physician expen-
ditures, Congress subsequently did not need to include 
physician payment as a target of savings in the Balanced 
Budget Act of 1997. 
Paying on the basis of input costs, however, ignores 
whether the services provide value for patients. The assump-
tion had been that what professionals decide to do with 
their professional time is the best determinant of value. Yet 
even in the mid-1980s, some had argued that Medicare 
should set the relative values not just on how physicians 
combine inputs to produce services but also on what it gets 
as outputs of a fee schedule in terms of benefit to beneficia-
ries and the program.40 That is, relative values should reflect 
relative value, not merely resource costs. Now, with more 
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POLITICS AND HEALTH CARE POLICY~-f ~~~ ~: 
President Clinton's and President Obama's Addresses to Congress 
President William J. Ointon's (1993-2001) nationally televised address to a joint session of Congress on September 22, 1993, marked one of the high points of public support 
for health care reform during the effort that began during his campaign in 1991 and ended in failure in September l994.1t was the first presidential address ever to Congress 
solely devoted to health care reform (lyndon Johnson [1963-1969) urged Congress to pass Medicare in honor of his martyred predecessor, John F. Kennedy [1961-1963], 
who had pushed for the program's enactment). 
Early polls showed overwhelming margins of public support for President Clinton's plan. Four months later, in January 1994, Clinton reiterated his pledge to veto any 
health care reform legislation that emerged from Congress but fell short of universal coverage. However, support for the president's plan eroded over the course of spring 
1994 and disintegrated entirely by the end of that summer. Democratic allies in Congress splintered into supporting different alternatives to Ointon's plan, Republicans 
united in total opposition, and the general public grew less supportive and more concerned about government efforts at reform in general. 
Unless we do this [pass health care reform), ... health care costs will devour more and more and more of our budget. Pretty soon all of you or the people 
who succeed you will be showing up here and writing out checks for health care and interest on the debt and worrying about whether we've got enough 
defense, and that will be it, unless we have the courage to achieve the savings that are plainly there before us. 
President Barack Obama's (2009- ) nationally televised health care reform address to a joint session of Congress on September 29, 2009, sixteen years after 
president Clinton's address, was delivered to a more partisan, divided audience. In contrast to Clinton's speech, Obama did not have a detailed presidential reform plan 
that he was promoting or trying to explain to the public. Instead, he listed a number of principles he argued were essential for any legislative proposal to receive his 
signature. In this way, he delegated far more power to congressional leaders in determining the details of the eventual Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act that he 
signed into law on March 23, 2010. Another key difference between the two presidents' efforts is that Democrats were the majority in both the House and the Senate for 
Obama, while Clinton had only a Democrat majority in the House during his effort. 
Then there's the problem of rising cost. We spend one and a half times more per person on health care than any other country, but we aren't any healthier 
for it. This is one of the reasons that insurance premiums have gone up three times faster than wages. It's why so many employers-especially small 
businesses-are forcing their employees to pay more for insurance, or are dropping their coverage entirely. It's why so many aspiring entrepreneurs can-
not afford to open a business in the first place, and why American businesses that compete internationally are at a huge disadvantage .••• 
Finally, our health care system is placing an unsustainable burden on taxpayers. When health care costs grow at the rate they have, it puts greater pressure 
on programs like Medicare and Medicaid."lf we do nothing to slow these skyrocketing costs, we will eventually be spending more on Medicare and-Medicaid 
than every other government program combined. Put simply, our health care problem is our deficit problem. Nothing else even comes close. Nothing else. 
Now, these are the facts. Nobody disputes them. We know we must reform this system. The question is how. 
than two decades of evidence that physician practice pat-
terns and costs vary significantly without important differ-
ences in quality or patient satisfaction, there is increasing 
recognition that purchasers, including Medicare, may not 
be getting their money's worth for their major investment in 
physician services. More specifically, while the volume and 
intensity of physician services vary across the country, the 
variations seem to make no difference in either quality or 
patient satisfactionY 
The introduction of Medicare's new physician pay-
ment reform also further complicated the doctor-hospital 
relationship. Many specialist surgeons petitioned their hos-
pitals to help them make up their income losses from 
Medicare, while hospital administrators increasingly pur-
sued joint ventures with physicians for outpatient services in 
order to enhance their institutions' revenues, which they 
increasingly needed to offset the declining generosity of 
Medicare's hospital payments.42 
Ultimately, though, the main problem with the 
Medicare physician fee schedule lies in the coupling of 
fixed budgets with fee-for-service reimbursements. First, 
the appropriate amount to be budgeted for physician ser-
vices may be difficult to determine.43 Using historic costs 
ignores the reality that technology changes, the popula-
tion's burden of illness changes, and other factors may sig-
nificantly alter how much should be allocated to any 
particular provider sector, such as physician services. The 
1997 Balanced Budget Act (BBA) altered the calculation of 
the volume performance standard by tying spending-per-
beneficiary on physician services to the rate of growth in 
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the national economy, as reflected in growth in the real 
gross domestic product; the new expenditure limitation 
was called the Sustainable Growth Rate (SGR).44 Whatever 
the theoretical merits of tying Medicare beneficiary needs 
for physician 'services to how the national economy is 
doing, the new SGR approach has proved unworkable and 
is currently subject to intense attention by Congress and its 
advisory bodies. 
Second, in a fixed, national budget arrangement, all 
physicians have an incentive to overprovide, because gains 
from overprovision would typically exceed the losses from 
the pro rata reductions that the application of the expendi-
ture limitation produces.45 Under this system, prudent phy-
sicians are penalized financially, while profligate ones are 
rewarded. The PPRC had hoped that organized medicine 
would step up to the challenge of national expenditure lim-
its by taking responsibility for rationalizing the volume of 
services through the establishment of clinical practice 
guidelines, enhanced peer review, and other professionally 
grounded approaches to reducing excessive volume and 
intensity of services.46 It never happened, nor has Medicare 
ever achieved significant and sustained cost containment 
with regard to the program's physician expenditures. 
Maintaining Health Care 
Cost Containment Proves Impossible 
Following President Clinton's landslide reelection in fall 
1996, representatives from both parties returned to using 
Medicare as a huge cost-containment mechanism in passing 
the Balanced Budget Act of 1997. The BBA constituted the 
ultimate subordination of Medicare to larger fiscal policy 
goals; it achieved approximately 73 percent of its total bud-
getary savings ($224 billion) from reductions in Medicare 
spending.47 The BBA also attempted to capitalize on the cost 
containment potential of managed care by encouraging mil-
lions of Medicare beneficiaries to enroll in private health 
plans as part of a new Medicare+Choice program. 
Temporary cost control by both Medicare and man-
aged care in the private sector ultimately led to an eco-
nomic reckoning that the U.S. health care system 
experienced in the late 1990s and the early 2000s. Health 
care reform by way of "managed competition" in the free 
market offered only a temporary solution to the nation's 
ongoing struggle with medical inflation.48 Both the BBA's 
major Medicare cuts and the final death throes of restric-
tive managed care left medical providers in 1998 and 1999 
MAP 17.1 Medicare Spending during the Last Two Years of Life for Chronically Ill Patients 
U.S. Average (Dollar amount) 
~
37,500 46,412 52,000 
NH 
MA 
AI 
The amount of Medicare spending on chronically ill patients varies by state, with New Jersey spending an average of almost $60,000 
per patient and North Dakota spending less than $33,000 per patient. The spending associated with chronically ill and end-of-life 
patients continues to be a major factor in the government's and the health care community's work to control costs. 
SOURCE: .'\dapted from the Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care by DWJ BOOKS LLC. 
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with declining payments from both public and private pay-
ers. Hospitals and home health agencies were particularly 
hard hit. When increasing cost pressures returned in the 
late 1990s, growing numbers of medical providers and 
managed care organizations found profitability difficult to 
achieve and bankruptcy a growing threat. 
Eventually, renewed cost pressures, the BBA's signifi-
cant Medicare cuts, and years of minimal (or nonexistent) 
payment increases from private payers left (1) the hospital 
industry with its lowest overall margins in a decade; (2) most 
physicians with increased workloads, less autonomy, and 
often reduced incomes; and (3) a slew of bankruptcies and 
near-bankruptcies among a wide variety of health care man-
agement and delivery organizations.49 Yet medical providers 
were not alone. Even as managed care organizations experi-
enced their own severe "profitability crisis;· the consumer 
and physician backlash against them Jed to an aggressive 
legislative and legal assault on the industry. The general 
public came to view commercial managed care as responsi-
ble for turning doctors "into entrepreneurs who maximize 
profits by minimizing care:•so 
The Managed Care Revolution Stalls 
Medical providers hastened the demise of traditional, 
restrictive managed care by consolidating into larger net-
works and practice groups, which vastly improved their 
bargaining leverage. A roaring economy in the late 1990s 
aided their efforts, because it led employ-
ers to request more generous and less 
restrictive health plans. By the early 2000s, 
most hospitals and physicians . were 
receiving sizeable payment increases. 
Private health plans followed suit and 
pursued their own consolidation strategy. 
Many managed care organizations and 
traditional health insurance companies 
either merged or exited the market alto-
gether. The surviving plans, facing less 
competition and more employer willing-
ness to pay higher costs, quickly restored 
their profitability by dropping money-
losing patient populations and increasing 
premiums. Employers also shifted more 
and more of their employees out of low-
cost HMOs into less restrictive preferred 
provider organizations, which allowed 
them to increase their employees' level of 
employers-stalled and surrendered. Managed care organi-
zations dropped most of the business practices that had 
restrained (at least temporarily) health care inflation in the 
United States. Many of them also dropped their participa-
tion in Medicare+Choice, after years of overreaching for 
''easy" Medicare profits, which left millions, of the program's 
beneficiaries scurrying to reestablish their coverage under 
the program's traditional fee~ for-service arrangements. 
This increased consolidation and the declining effec-
tiveness of market forces triggered a return to rampant 
medical inflation in the 2000s. Health plans and hospitals 
successfully negotiated significant payment increases after 
years of minimal or no revenue growth, which restored the 
majority of them to solid financial health. However, sky-
rocketing health insurance costs and a sluggish economy left 
an additional five million Americans without health insur-
ance coverage by 2003.52 Medical-related bankruptcies 
increased substantially, as did the costs of and enrollment in 
Medicaid. 
In the midst of these and other deteriorating health 
care trends, President George W. Bush and Congress passed 
the largest expansion of Medicare since the program's enact-
ment in 1965. The 2003 Medicare Prescription Drug, 
Improvement, and Modernization Act differed from the 
pattern established between the 1983 Social Security reforms 
and the 1997 BBA. It added a hugely expensive (almost $550 
billion between 2006 and 2015) drug benefit with major 
cost-sharing.51 
The result is that the managed care 
revolution-which was principally about 
the private sector forcing medical provid-
ers (primarily hospitals and physicians) to 
The United States spends more on health care than any other nation in the world, 
about $8,200 per person per year as of 2012. That figure is more than two-and-a-
half times higher than most developed nations in the world, including relatively 
wealthy European countries such as Sweden, France, and the United Kingdom. U.S. 
health care now accounts for 18 percent of gross domestic product. 
provide discounts to health plans and SOURCE: Brendan Smialowski!AFP/Getty Images. 
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coverage gaps for millions of people who spend moderate to 
high amounts on prescription drugs.53 It injected the first 
elements of means-testing into Medicare, by which wealth-
ier beneficiaries will pay more than poor beneficiaries for 
both their Part B (physician and outpatient) services and 
Part D drug benefits. It also pushed the program toward 
increased privatization with a financial overcommitment to 
private health plans that enroll Medicare beneficiaries. 
These measures have not resulted in any noteworthy health 
care expenditure restraint. 
Currently, while about thirty-three million Medicare 
beneficiaries voluntarily enroll in the program's Part D 
KEY DECISIONS: HEALTH CARE CRISES AND SOLUTIONS~·, ,_ 
Section 3403 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act: The Independent Medicare 
Advisory Board (also known as the Independent Payment Advisory Board) 
.. " ; 
This section of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act establishes specific target growth rates for Medicare and charges the Independent Payment Advisory Board 
(IPAB) with ensuring that Medicare expenditures stay within these limits. The IPAB must also make recommendations to Congress as to how to control health care costs 
more generally. As noted by Bruce Vladeck in 1999 in Health Affairs, the IPAB 
will have significant authority to curb rising Medicare spending if per beneficiary growth in that spending exceeds target growth rates. In a process that began 
in 2013, recommendations made by the 15-m ember board will go to Congress for rapid consideration; Congress must adopt these or enact savings of similar 
size in Medicare. If Congress doesn't act within a specified timetable, the secretary of health and human services (HHS) must implement the board's recom-
mendations. The board is not allowed by law to recommend changes in premiums, benefits, eligibility, or taxes, or other changes that would result in "ration-
ing" of care to Medicare beneficiaries. 
SEC. 3403.1NDEPENDENT MEDICARE ADVISORY BOARD. 
(a) BOARD.-(1) IN GENERAL-Title XVIII of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1395 et seq.), as amended by section 3022, is amended by adding at the end 
the following new section: 
INDEPENDENT MEDICARE ADVISORY BOARD 
SEC. 1899A. (a) ESTABLISHMENT.-There is established an independent board to be known as the"lndependent Medicare Advisory Board." 
(b) PURPOSE.-It is the purpose of this section to, in accordance with the following provisions of this section, reduce the per capita rate of growth in Medicare 
spending-
(1) by requiring the Chief Actuary of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services to determine in each year to which this section applies (in this section 
referred to as "a determination year'} the projected per capita growth rate under Medicare for the second year following the determination year (in this 
section referred to as "an implementation year"); 
(2) if the projection for the implementation year exceeds the target growth rate for that year, by requiring the Board to develop and submit during the first 
year following the determination year (in this section referred to as •a proposal year") a proposal containing recommendations to reduce the Medicare per 
capita growth rate to the extent required by this section; and 
(3) by requiring the Secretary to implement such proposals unless Congress enacts legislation pursuant to this section. 
(c) BOARD PROPOSAlS.-
(1) DEVELOPMENT.-
(A) IN GENERAL-The Board shall develop detailed and specific proposals related to the Medicare program in accordance with the succeeding provisions of 
this section. 
(B) ADVISORY REPORTS.-Beginning January 15, 2014, the Board may develop and submit to Congress advisory reports on matters related to the Medicare 
program, regardless of whether or not the Board submitted a proposal for such year. Such a report may, for years prior to 2020, include recommendations 
regarding improvements to payment systems for providers of services and suppliers who are not otherwise subject to the scope of the Board's recommenda-
tions in a proposal under this section. Any advisory report submitted under this subparagraph shall not be subject to the rules for congressional consideration 
under subsection (d). 
pharmaceutical program, it was designed (and continues to 
operate) largely on financing from general revenues, which 
are 80 percent of the program's total cost. Many leading 
Republicans in Congress were hopeful that forcing the new 
benefit to be financed from general revenues would make its 
total cost more transparent and, thus, of greater concern in 
annual budget negotiations. On the individual level, policy-
makers also tried to restrain the new benefit's cost growth by 
including a "donut hole;· whereby once a Medieare benefi-
ciary reaches $2,930 of Part D spending on pharmaceuticals in 
a calendar year, he or she becomes responsible for any addi-
tional drug costs accrued up to $4,800, at which point Part 
D coverage reengages. Part of the 2010 Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act includes a gradual phasing out of 
the donut hole until its closure by 2020. Part D has been less 
costly than originally predicted, largely due to the fact that 
only about 77 percent of Medicare beneficiaries have 
enrolled in the benefit (rather than the original estimate of 
93 percent). Yet monthly premiums have increased each 
year of operation by approximately 10 percent and are pre-
dicted to continue increasing by the same annual rate. 
Additionally, total Part D expenditures will increase from 
roughly $85 billion in 2013 to around $150 billion by 2020. 
THE IMPACT OF THE PATIENT 
. PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE 
CARE ACT ON HEALTH CARE COSTS 
The need for health care cost containment has only become 
more urgent in recent years. The landmark passage of the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) in 
March 2010, along with its constitutional upholding by a 
slim 5-4 Supreme Court vote and President Obama's reelec-
tion in November 2012, will dramatically increase the num-
ber of insured people with access to more health care. 
Roughly thirty million currently uninsured individuals 
were expected to gain insurance coverage starting in 20 14, 
which will cost hundreds of billions of dollars by the end of 
the decade. Also, as a demographic tidal wave (the baby 
boom generation) began retiring in 2010, the government's 
longtime use of Medicare as a fiscal "cash cow" for other 
budgetary purposes has become much more problematic 
despite the fact that the PPACA depends on hundreds of 
billions of dollars in reduced future Medicare payments to 
health care providers-mostly hospitals and physicians-to 
finance expansions in health insurance coverage. 
Furthermore, with health care expenditures constituting 18 
percent of gross domestic product and on course to reach 
expenditures of 20 percent by 2020, employers and govern-
ment leaders are hoping that alternative reimbursement 
models such as bundled episode payments and capitation to 
medical homes and Accountable Care Organizations will 
engender better quality and slow cost growth.54 To date, 
TABLE 17.1 Federal Government Spending on and 
Financial Support of Health Care in the 
United States 
Program 
Tax expenditure on employer-
provided health insurance 
Medicare 
Medicaid (federal portion) 
Children's Health Insurance 
Program (federal portion) 
Department of Veterans Affairs 
Indian Health Service 
National Institutes of Health 
TOTAL 
Approximate Amount of 
Federal Spending (2011) 
$260 billion 
$550 billion 
$275 billion 
$8 billion 
$90 billion 
$4 billion 
$31 billion 
$1.3 trillion 
SOURCES: Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Manage-
ment and Budget, Congressional Budget Office. 
unfortunately, preliminary pilot studies have given little 
reason for observers to be overly optimistic about any major 
health care cost containment in the near future. 
Ultimately, as health economist Victor Fuchs observes, 
It is difficult to see how the health sector can continue to 
expand rapidly at the expense of the rest of the economy, 
but every past prediction of a sustained slowing of the 
growth of health expenditures has been proved wrong. 
Rapid growth may continue as a result of political grid-
lock regarding the form that curbs on expenditures 
should take. There is no public consensus about how 
much care should be provided for the poor and sick or 
how it should be done. Similarly; there's no public con-
sensus regarding efforts to increase the efficiency of care. 
A rational approach to the financing, organization, and 
delivery of care seems politically impossible. However, 
the observation by [Alexis] de Tocqueville [the French 
political thinker who toured the United States in the 
1830s] that in the United States "events can move from 
the impossible to the inevitable without ever stopping at 
the probable" may prove to be prescient. 55 
See also Chapter 13: Government Financing of Health 
Care (1940s-Present); Chapter 14: Biomedical Research 
Policy and Innovation (1940s-Present); Chapter 16: 
Promoting Health Care Quality and Safety ( 1960s-
Present); Chapter 18: Health and Health Care Policy: 
Ethical Perspectives (1970s-Present); Chapter 20: 
Women's Issues and American Health Care Policy 
(1960s-Present); Chapter 21: Minorities, Immigrants, 
and Health Care Policy: Disparities and Solutions 
(1960s-Present); Chapter 26: Interest Groups, Think 
Tanks, and Health Care Policy {1960s-Present). 
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